MEASURING AND FINGERPRINTING CLICK-SPAM IN AD NETWORKS

Vacha Dave *, Saikat Guha★ and Yin Zhang *

* The University of Texas at Austin

* Microsoft Research India

Internet Advertising Today

- Online advertising is a 31 billion dollar industry *
- Publishers can monetize traffic
 - Blogs, News sites, Syndicated search engines
 - Revenue for content development

- Pay-per-click advertising
 - Advertisers pay per-click to ad networks
 - Publishers make a 70% cut on each click on their site

Click-spam in Ad Networks

Click-spam

- Fraudulent or invalid clicks
- Users delivered to the advertiser site are uninterested
- Advertisers lose money

Possible Motives

- Malicious advertisers (or other parties)
 - Deplete competitor's ad budgets
 - Isolated cases
- Publishers/Syndicated search engines
 - Make money on every click that happens on their site

Click-spam in Ad Networks

Microsoft, which offers pay-per-click ads through its adCenter service, says click laundering -- an offshoot of click fraud, which has plagued the industry for years -- is growing in scale and sophistication. "This is the newest form of criminal activity on the Internet," says Brad Smith, Microsoft's general counsel.

How Click Laundering Works

See a graphic provided by Microsoft on how click laundering works. In the RedOrbit case, Microsoft says it discovered the alleged scheme after detecting a growing number of suspicious clicks from RedOrbit's site over a

two-week period starting in January 2009. The site had previously averaged 75 clicks a day, but the number spiked above 10,000 clicks per day, according to the complaint.


According to Microsoft, RedOrbit was able to manufacture large numbers of bogus clicks on shady sites known as parked domains—Web sites that are legal but exist only to display ads. In this case, many of the ads were invisible to the naked eye. Then, using a technical slight of hand, it submitted the clicks to Microsoft in a way that made them appear to have occurred on RedOrbit's own site, a requirement for getting paid.

Mobile Devices and Ads

Ant

Ant Smasher

- Mobile game
- Squish the ant to win the game
- Ads placed close to where user is expected to click



Click-spam Detection

- No ground truth
 - Almost impossible to know if particular click is genuine
 - Need to guess the intent of user
- Different levels of click-spam in different segments
 - Aggregate numbers are meaningless
- Ad networks aren't transparent
 - Security by obscurity
- Real problem lot of work needed
 - ◆ Researchers lack real attack data

Contributions

- First method to independently estimate click-spam
 - As an advertiser
 - For specific keywords
- Test across ten ad networks
 - Search, contextual, social and mobile ad networks
 - Show that click-spam is a problem
 - For Mobile and Social ad networks
- Discover five classes of sophisticated attacks
 - Why simple heuristics don't work
- Release data for researchers


Estimating click-spam — Approach

- Hard to classify any single click
 - ◆ Estimate fraction of click-spam

- Designed Bayesian estimation framework
 - Uses only advertiser-measurable quantities

- Cancel out unmeasurable quantities
 - ◆ By relating different mixes of good and bad traffic

Estimating Click-spam – Main Idea




non-spammers

Both non-spammers and

spammers click ads

Some non-spammers buy

Dissecting Black box – Hurdles



- Different hurdles have different hardness
 - ♦ 5 sec wait, Click to continue
- Send only a fraction of traffic through hurdles
 - To minimize impact on user experience
- Perfect hurdle would block all spam
- In reality, some spammers get through (False Negatives)

Dissecting Black box - Bluff Ads[1]

- Bluff Ads
 - ◆ Junk ad text with normal keywords, same targeting
 - Normal users unlikely to click

Celebrity Cruise
Be Recognized, Celebrated, And
Indulged Aboard Celebrity Cruises
cruisewithceleb.com

Massive smile Literature
Cream Fix Gutter Bad Keys
cruisewithceleb.com

Massive smile Literature
Cream Fix Gutter Bad Keys
cruisewithceleb.com

Spammers and curious users click on an ad






Some spammers and users may see the content

Bluff

Dissecting Black box - Bluff Ads[1]

- Maximum False Negative rate known for each hurdle
- Can be subtracted out



Testing Ad Networks

- Sign up as advertisers for ten ad networks
 - Search, Contextual, Mobile and Social
 - Google, Bing, AdMob, InMobi, Facebook and others
- 240 Ads
 - Keywords: Celebrity, Yoga, Lawnmower
 - Hurdles: Click to continue, 5 sec wait
- 50,000 Clicks
 - 30,000 bluff ad clicks
- ◆ Cost: \$1500





Celebrity Cruise

Be Recognized, Celebrated, And Indulged Aboard Celebrity Cruises cruisewithceleb.com

Gentle Yoga for Beginners

No pretzel poses...just easy yoga for beginners. Award-winning DVDs. gentleyogaforbeginners.com

Buy Any Zero Turn Mower
Get Free S&H +Pay No Tax \$2,079.99
CALL or Shop Online 4 Lowest Prices
zeroturnlawnmowers.com




Uh-oh. How do we validate?


No ground truth!

Compare against search ads on Google and Bing


Results – Validation using search ads




Results – Validation using search ads



Results – Estimating Mobile Spam



Results – Estimating Contextual Spam




All networks seem to be underestimating the amount of spam


Where is click-spam coming from?


- Analyze bluff ad clicks
 - Publishers: Strong motive
 - Instead of clicks/users
 - Manual Investigation
- Challenge: Scale
 - ◆ 3000+ publishers, 30,000 Clicks
- Identical sites!
- Cluster on cosine similarity
 - Feature vector
 - WHOIS, IP Address/Subnet, HTTP parameters















Case Study 1 - Malware driven click fraud




Case Study 1 - Malware driven Click fraud

- ◆ Responsible Malware: TDL4
 - Validation: Run malware in VM
- Can intercept and redirect all browser requests
 - ◆ Browser specific filtering doesn't work
- Only 1 click per IP address per day
 - ◆ Threshold based filtering doesn't work
- Mimics real user behavior
 - ◆ Timing analysis doesn't work

ClickSpam and Arbitrage

- Polished forum sites
- Bluff ad clicks on ad network X
- No malware reports
- Not popular
 - Where do they get traffic?
- No ads on the site!!




Click-spam and Arbitrage

Work From Home-Now Hiring 3 Positions Available - \$17-21/Hour Based On Experience. Apply Now! DoTellAll.com/Apply

Site pays \$ to Y

- Advertiser on network Y
 - Creates 4500+ ads
- Publisher on network X
- Page now has only ads
 - No questions or answers
- Confusing users into clicks



Click-spam and Arbitrage


Work From Home-Now Hiring 3 Positions Available - \$17-21/Hour Based On Experience. Apply Now! DoTellAll.com/Apply Site pays \$ to Y

- Tricking real users into clicking
 - Bot detection techniques don't apply



Case Study3 - Click Fraud using Parked Domains

Go to icicibank.com



Jane ends up on icicibank.com icicibank.com pays for a


Case Study3 - Click Fraud using Parked Domains


- ◆ 41 of 400 parked domains hosted on a single IP
 - Misspellings of common websites:
 - icicbank.com, nsdi.com ©
 - Auto-redirect depends on Jane's geo-location
 - ◆ IP hosts 500,000 such domains
- User mistypes a URL
 - Advertiser must pay!
- User behavior indistinguishable from normal traffic
 - ◆ Naively using conversions don't work


Case Study 4 – Mobile click-spam


- Indian Mobile ad network
 - Supplies WAP Ads to a group of WAP porn sites
 - ◆ Ad links indistinguishable from porn video links

- Gaming apps
 - ◆ Place ads close to where users are expected to click
 - Ant-Smasher, Milk-the-Cow, and 50 others









Summary

- Click-spam remains a problem
- First way of estimating click-spam Independently
 - ◆ As an advertiser, for a set of keywords
 - Extensive validation
- Sophisticated click-spam attacks today
 - Sybil sites
 - Malware mimics user behavior
 - Social engineering attacks and others
- Dataset is available for download
 - All clicks (minimally sanitized)
 - ♦ http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~vacha/sigcomm12-clickspam.tar.gz

Thanks!

Data at:

http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~vacha/sigcomm12-clickspam.tar.gz